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BOOK REVIEWS

LAW AND PSYCHIATRY
By SHELDON GLUECK. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press,
1962. ix. 181 pp. $4.95.
This book, with slight modifications, is the series of four
lectures delivered by its author at the Schools of Law and of
Medicine, Tulane University, in April, 1962, under the Isaac
Ray Award of the American Psychiatric Association. In spite
of its relatively short length, it contains a treasure of information and well-considered opinion which should be of
inestimable value to lawyers, law students, judges and everyone
interested in orderly progress toward solving the knotty
problems inherent in the often maligned defense of insanity to
criminal charges.
Recognizing that lawyers and psychiatrists have been in
conflict over not only the formulation of what legal rules should
govern the defense of insanity, but also over the nature of what
proof gives rise to the application of such rules, Professor
Glueck carefully analyzes the important dilemmas which frequently prevent agreement between the two. This portion of
the book, found in the first chapter, is an outstanding example
of pure exposition. Here the reader will find, unencumbered by
opinion or prejudice, an explanation of the opposing concepts
of free will and the conditioned individual. Interwoven with
this discussion is a consideration of the closely connected
problem of degrees of responsibility and blameworthiness.
This discussion is made meaningful in practical terms by
application to the M'Naughten, Durham, and A. L. I. rules and
English-Scot ideas of diminished or partial responsibility. A
related dilemma discussed by Professor Glueck stems from the
fact that the law, in defining the substance of various crimes as
well as the essentials for relief from responsibility, takes no
account of the psychological and sociological considerations
which psychiatrists regard as basic to the explanation of human
conduct. In short the fact that motive is irrelevant, except in a
very few crimes, removes from judicial consideration what is
known as "the affective or emotional aspect of mental life."
Other dilemmas mentioned, but not discussed at length until
the final chapter, deal with the shortage of psychiatrists necessary to rehabilitate those excused from punishment because
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of mental disease and the fact that many members of the legal
profession are distrustful of psychiatric thinking because of the
relative newness of psychiatry as a science.
With the dilemmas laid bare, Professor Glueck proceeds to a
consideration of what factors should, in modern society, be
significant in formulating not only a workable, but also a
psychiatrically oriented rule by which to allow juries or judges
to evaluate the defense of irresponsibility for the commission of
crime. These factors are well worth summarizing: (1) the test
must be in terms familiar enough to be understood by jurymen,
(2) it must be just, not subjecting to punishment one whose
crime probably resulted from mental abberation, (3) it must be
in harmony with modern psychiatric concepts yet flexible
enough to encompass new discoveries, (4) it must allow the
psychiatric expert witness to state his diagnosis in dogmatic
..yes" or "no" terms, (6) it should not require the psychiatric
expert to commit himself to a conclusion regarding the
responsibility of the accused for the crime charged, and (7) it
must be protective of society, not permitting dangerous persons to be at large in the community. Current tests-from
M'Naughten to Durham and the A. L. I. rule-are measured
against these factors and, of course, found wanting. However,
the fact that current rules are found wanting by Professor
Glueck does not mean, except possibly as to the M'Naughten
rule, that they are condemned as utterly useless. The reader
gains the definite impression that the Durham rule, for example,
could be of significant value if the courts using it would take the
initiative in defining, from case to case, the meaning and application of the terms, "product" and "mental disease."
One criticism of the M'Naughten rule will likely encourage
some disagreement. Relative to his fifth criteria for a desirable
test, Professor Glueck points out that often the psychiatric
expert witness is limited to giving "yes" or "no" answers while
testifying and that he is not permitted to explain his answers.
Doubtless this is true in New York as shown in the example
quoted from People v. Horton, 308 N. Y. 1, 20-21, 123 N. E.2d
609 618-619 (1954). But the fact remains that many trial judges
in other jurisdictions do permit the psychiatric expert to propound at length in qualifying his answers. And even where
qualification is not permitted on cross-examination, there is
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ample opportunity for it to be done on redirect. As a result
many psychiatrists who have attempted to understand the
judicial process are able, even when testifying under the
M'Naughten rule, to escape the confines of merely cognitive
values. Into their testimony they weave many considerations of
"total personality," motive and causation and conclude, in
terms acceptable to the law as well as psychiatry, that the accused did not know what he was doing. Perhaps the real
trouble is not in any of the current expressions of the legal test
for insanity but in the fact that many juries will not accept
psychiatric testimony because they realize so much of it is
based on self-serving declarations of the accused coupled with
the genius that comes only from hindsight.
Notwithstanding, this is inherent in the dilemmas explained
by Professor Glueck and his criticism serves well to focus
attention on the fact that the problem is not merely one of
formulating an acceptable test. Hand-in-glove with this task
are two further considerations-the question of the procedure
to be followed and the question of the quantum or quality of
proof to be used before the question of irresponsibility is
raised in the trial setting. While Professor Glueck is definitely
not of the school that would abolish the jury in cases involving
the defense of irresponsibility, he realizes the value of using
neutral alienists both before and during trial. Massachusetts'
Briggs Law calling for pre-trial examination by neutral psychiatrists is cited as one example of reducing the "battle of experts."
The A. L. I.'s Model Penal Code is also cited as featuring pretrial mental examination when notice is given that irresponsibility is to be a defense to criminal charges.
It is in his discussion of the Durham decision, to which an
entire chapter is devoted, that Professor Glueck reveals the
problems concerning the difficulties of producing evidence
satisfactory to satisfy the requirement that the jury find the
defendant was suffering from a "mental disease" at the time of
the commission of the allegedly criminal act. "What... is
'mental disease' in the Durham formula?" he asks. "Does it
include the more extreme and obvious psychoneuroses? Does
it include the psychopathic or 'sociopathic' personality types?"
While these questions are not given, and probably cannot be
given, categoric answers, it is pointed out that the District of
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Columbia Court is fulfilling its duty of refining the basic
formula in the light of the exact problems presented case by
case. Yet, even so, it becomes apparent that such a process can
lead to confusion unless not only Durham but M'Naughten and
the A. L. I. rules as well are coupled with a rule of evidence
which will afford some boundary, some defined frame of
reference, as guideposts for the jury. One cannot help coming
to the conclusion that it is not entirely the responsibility of the
law to formulate such a rule. Since it must of necessity entail
much of the substance of psychiatric definition of mental
disease, psychiatry as a science must come to agreement on
basic tenets and assist lawyers, judges and legislators in framing
such tenets in language meaningful to the triers of fact.
As to what quantum of evidence it takes to raise the question of irresponsibility, it is apparent that the law itself suffers
from a great deal of variance. In the District of Columbia, for
example, Glueck mentions that some evidence of insanity is all
that it needed to rebut the presumption of sanity. It then becomes the burden of the prosecution to prove the defendant
sane beyond a reasonable doubt. This, of course, is often a
difficult burden to bear, and as Glueck demonstrates provides
one of the major criticisms of the Durham case.
On the basis of his evaluation of the Durham rule, Professor
Glueck formulates a rule of his own. In essence his rule has
three facets: (1) iftheaccused is found to be suffering from mental
disease of defect which impaired his powers of thinking,
feeling, willing or self-integration and that such impairment
probably made it impossible for him to understand or control
the act with which he is charged as a normal person understands and controls his acts, he should be found not guilty on the
groundof insanity; (2) if the accused is suffering from a mental
disease or defect in the manner above, but it is doubtiulthat such
impairment made it impossible for him to understand or control
the act with which he is charged as the normal person understands and controls his acts, he should be found only partially
responsible; (3) if the accused be found not to be suffering from
mental disease or defect at the time of the crime, he should be
found guilty.
It is considered advisable, also, for the judge to instruct the
jury what corrections or punishments will be meted out to the
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accused in the event of any one of the three findings. In the
event of a finding of (1), the accused will be committed to a
public mental hospital for supervision and treatment until such
time as a court will find on the basis of the superintendent's
certification that the accused is no longer dangerous. A finding
under (2) will result in the accused's being committed to a
public mental hospital until a court will find on the basis of
certification by the superintendent that he is no longer criminally dangerous and then he will be transferred to the jurisdiction of correctional and paroling authorities. A finding
under (3) will result in punishment as prescribed by law.
Readers may be tempted to jump to the conclusion that the
Glueck formulation makes the assumption that because one
has some sort of a mental disorder he is therefore criminally
irresponsible. And if this is so, one of the most criticized
features of the Durham rule is not cured. Yet, partially saving
the Glueck formula from such criticism is the coupling of his
rule with a rule of procedural evidence which calls for the
accused to make an initial showing of mental illness by a
preponderance of proof "(and therefore of probability)"
(if the rule were adopted without its partial responsibility feature) before the prosecution would be deprived of the presumption of sanity. Yet the reader will, perhaps, have lingering
doubts about the advisability of equating mental illness in general with irresponsibility for crime. Yet, as Glueck mentions,
psychiatrists do recognize that not all personality variances from
the norm are mental illnesses. The trouble may be that the
psychiatrists have not convinced legislatures and the public of
this knowledge.
However, to yield to the temptation of such criticism is to
sell Professor Glueck very short. Actually, his suggestion for
armistice between law and psychiatry is built on more lasting
foundations than merely creating new legal tests for insanity on
abstract, academic bases. His formulation is, rather, an inherent
part of the realization that our methods of dealing with those
who commit grave anti-social acts really accomplish only one
result-that of punishment by society. There is little in prison
life and administration that results in either deterrence or in
rehabilitation. As Glueck, along with many others, has
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demonstrated time and again, our system lends itself best to
fostering recidivism.
The real problem, then, in resolving the conflict between
law and society lies not merely in determining the best legal
test by which to adjudge an accused responsible or not for a
criminal act. More basic reforms are needed. Glueck suggests
a clinic approach to those who have committed criminal acts
and who have mental abberation involved in the commission of
the act. But, at the same time, he is careful to document the
fact that existing public mental institutions are not equipped
for the job and that few psychiatrists have the training for such
work. Further, as he so clearly and cogently suggests very
little is actually known from an interdisciplinary viewpoint or
from a basic research view of the causes of criminal motivation.
The opportunities for research are practically without limit.
Although realizing that there is much to be done before
existing systems are changed, Professor Glueck gives sincere
reasons for great expectations. Perhaps the most important of
the reasons, from the viewpoint of the lawyer, is the fact that
law and psychiatry are coming to something of a friendly understanding. Many psychiatrists have convinced lawyers that
their science has much to offer the law, and many lawyers have
likewise convinced scientists not only of the desirability of the
stability of law but also of the fact that sound improvement in
law is much to be desired.
Law andPsychiatry: Cold War or Entente Cordiale, then, provides an important and most significant contribution to
American Legal Literature. Its discussion of basic problems and
dilemmas is sound and unbiased. Its suggestions for improvement are characterized by soundness of logic and complete
evaluations of the relevant legal and social factors involved.
Many law teachers will make it required reading for students of
criminal law. All who read it will profit from its thorough
understanding of the problems involved and its honest suggestions for answers to those problems.
JAMES P. WHYTE,

Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law,
College of William and Mary

